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THE USE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE TO
ADDRESS POLICE SUPERVISORY AND
DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES: THE CHICAGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S BROKEN SYSTEM
CRAIG B. FUTrERMAN, H. MELISSA MATHER
AND MELANIE MILES*

INTRODUCTION

In 2003 and 2004, Diane, a 50-year-old African American
school janitor and mother of three, was subjected to multiple acts
of abuse by a group of Chicago police officers. These officers
were members of an elite tactical team that patrolledpublic housing on Chicago's South Side. Known to local residents as the
"Skullcap Crew," they had a reputationfor racist and sadistic behavior. Over the course of a year, they targeted Dianefor abuse.
* Craig B. Futterman, Clinical Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School; B.A., Northwestern University, 1988; J.D., Stanford Law School,
2001. H. Melissa Mather, Former Clinical lecturer at the University of Chicago, 2005-07, The Law Offices of H. Melissa Mather, Austin, Texas; B.A.,
University of Virginia, 1994; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1997.
Melanie Miles, Associate at Schwartz Cooper Chartered, Chicago, Illinois;
B.A., Duke University, 2004; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 2007.
The authors worked together with a team of University of Chicago Law students to represent Diane Bond in her constitutional challenge of the City of
Chicago's practices for supervising and controlling its rogue police officers.
The authors wish to acknowledge Diane for her courage in her efforts to
prevent other women from suffering similar abuse at the hands of law enforcement. The authors also wish to thank Jamie Kalven (our partner on the
ground), the entire Stateway community (which generously welcomed us and
provided the true knowledge and inspiration for this article), Steve Whitman
and Jade Dell (our mathematical guides), Emma Rodriguez-Ayala, a dedicated team of University of Chicago Law students (now graduates) (you
know who you are) and G. Flint Taylor (who paved the way for Monell police
reform litigation).
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On two separate occasions, they forced her to disrobe and bare
the most private parts of her body. They threatened her with a
loaded gun, needle-nosed pliers and a screwdriver, leaving her
convinced that they planned to rape and kill her. They beat and
choked her. They hurled racialand gender-based epithets toward
her. They tore up her home. They desecratedreligious objects sacred to her. They threatened to plant drugs on her and to falsely
arrest her. They beat her teenage son. They brought a middleaged African American neighbor into her home and forced her
son to beat the older man for their amusement. Diane was subjected to these assaults on multiple occasions, despite filing complaints with the Chicago Police Department (CPD). The officers
denied any contact whatsoever with Diane, and the CPD failed to
sustain any of her complaints.1
Over the past six years, the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic
of the University of Chicago Law School collaborated with activist and author Jamie Kalven and residents of the Stateway
Gardens, the public housing community where Diane lived, on a
human rights documentation, advocacy and self-help program
focused on issues of police accountability. Together this group
documented instances of police misconduct on the ground.
When the group began this initiative, Stateway Gardens with
the Robert Taylor Homes to the south, constituted the largest
concentration of public housing - and poverty - in the nation.2 In the course of our involvement there, community mem-

1 A full account of Diane's story appears in a series of articles by

JAMIE

(2005),
http://www.viewfromtheground.com/wp-content/media/ktp/kicking-the-pigeon.pdf. The lawsuit that arose out of this abuse is Bond v. Utreras, et al.,
KALVEN,

THE VIEW FROM THE

GROUND,

KICKING THE PIGEON

No. 04-cv-2617 (N.D. Ill.) (dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a settlement
agreement with the City of Chicago on Mar. 23, 2007).

Flynn McRoberts and Terry Wilson, CHA has 9 of 10 Poorest Areas in U.S.,
Study Says, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 1995, at 1. See also D. Bradford Hunt, What
Went Wrong with Public Housing in Chicago? A History of the Robert Taylor
Homes, JOURNAL OF THE ILLINOIS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Spring
2

2001).
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bers were displaced, and the highrises in which they lived were
demolished as part of the Chicago Housing Authority's "Plan
for Transformation." 3 Today the site is being redeveloped into a
mixed income community.
In our years working at Stateway Gardens, we witnessed the
operation of a different Constitution from that taught in law
school classrooms. Aggressive stop and frisks, street interrogations and searches of community members' homes associated
with the war on drugs in the inner city created the context that
was the prelude to human rights abuses on a grander scale.
Groups of officers like the Skullcap Crew committed these acts
against people like Diane. 4 The expected rules were simply different in this community. Whenever police cars pulled into a
public housing development, the young Black men outside expected to be searched and treated with the suspicion of being a
criminal. 5 Police misconduct that would generate a public outcry
in the university community, and in many of the communities
from which we came, was a routine reality at Stateway.
The Skullcap Crew's abuse of Diane occurred in this context.
A team of University of Chicago law students investigated the
officers who abused Diane. Our investigation revealed that
these five officers were well-known to public housing residents
on the South Side of Chicago for their physical brutality, their
casual acts of cruelty and their overt racism. We heard multiple
first-hand reports of their years-long reign of terror and racial
The Chicago Housing Authority approved a $1.6 billion plan in 2000 to
"transform" public housing in Chicago through an aggressive process of demolition, forced relocation and redevelopment. See e.g., Casey Sanchez, Six
More Years, CHICAGO REPORTER,Sept. 2006.
4 See Bernard Harcourt, UnconstitutionalPolice Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. POL'Y 363 (2004), for a thoughtful
essay raising fundamental questions about the implications of aggressive policing strategies associated with the war on drugs.
5 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (requires that the police must have
reasonable and articulable belief that a particular individual is armed and
dangerous in order to conduct a stop and frisk).
3
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abuse of African Americans in public housing communities.
These stories included the lining up a group of young Black men
and kicking them in their testicles, ordering African American
men to strike Black women at the threat of arrest, strip-searching African American women and ridiculing their bodies, planting illegal drugs on innocent people and stealing money from
and protecting drug dealers.
Above all, residents reported that what made these acts of
abuse particularly demeaning and dehumanizing was the officers' racism and the pleasure they took in their racist acts.
"They get their jollies humiliating Black folks," a former resident reported. "They get off on it."6
How could the Skullcap Crew be so confident they could use
their police powers to abuse African Americans in public housing with impunity?
Over the past three years, that question has been at the center
of our work - what conditions were in place that allowed this
small band of officers to engage in a pattern of abuse of African
Americans without fear of consequence? Accordingly, we
brought suit not only against the individual officers for their violations of Diane's constitutional rights, but also later filed a Monel 7 claim against the City of Chicago, charging that the City
has a policy and practice of failing to adequately supervise, mon8
itor, discipline and otherwise control its police officers.
This article summarizes our statistical analyses and findings
about the Chicago Police Department's broken supervisory and
disciplinary systems. The purpose of the article is threefold.
First, we aim to demonstrate the fundamental and systemic nature of the problems with the Chicago Police Department's disciplinary and supervisory systems. An accurate assessment of
these systems is a necessary condition for meaningful reform.
6

See Kalven, supra note 1, at 14.

7 Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2007).
Mar. 23, 2007).
8 Bond, No. 04-cv-2617 (N.D. I11.
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Second, we seek to illustrate how statistical analysis, an often
underutilized tool in Monell claims, can provide powerful evidence of deficiencies in a municipality's practices of supervising
and disciplining its police officers. We hope to encourage advocates, reformers and policymakers around the nation to undertake similar analyses to improve police accountability in other
law enforcement agencies. Finally, we hope to engage the reader
with a series of fundamental questions that stem from our findings about the impunity that has enabled abuse to occur in certain communities. 9
Part I of the article provides a brief legal background about
civil rights litigation against municipalities, through which individuals may act as private attorneys general, by bringing systemic constitutional challenges to widespread but unwritten
municipal police practices that operate with the force of law.
Part II summarizes our findings from our analysis of Chicago
police data about the problems with its practices for supervising
and disciplining police officers. Part III seeks to initiate a conversation about the broader implications of those findings.
I.
A.

LEGAL BACKDROP

The Promise and Peril of Bringing Monell Claims

Monell v. Department of Social Services1o is one of the
landmark civil rights cases of the past century. On the one hand,
it opened up the possibility for true systemic reform by providemerged from an academic conference that grew out of
our collaborative work, titled: The View From the Ground: Issues and Inquiries Arising from Eight Square Blocks of Chicago's South Side, held at the
University of Chicago Law School spring 2007. A number of questions raised
in this article were explored in depth at the conference. We hope that this
article encourages others to take on these questions - to take seriously a
view from the ground. A webcast of conference highlights and other information about the conference is available at http://invisibleinstitute.com/conference (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
10 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
9 This article also
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ing an avenue for litigants to hold local municipalities, rather
than simply individuals, liable for unconstitutional policies.11 On
the other hand, it severely restricted the circumstances under
which municipalities could be held liable, foreclosing the possibility of straight-forward respondeat superior liability. Instead it
set barriers to municipal liability higher than those necessary to
recover punitive damages against private individuals.1 2 Monell
claims represent one of the last available remedies for private
parties to obtain meaningful reform of unconstitutional local
policies through the federal courts, particularly in light of what
one commentator has called the "de facto prohibition on injunctions in police abuse cases" 3 enshrined by the Supreme Court in
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.14
In order to recover under Monell, however, a plaintiff must
show not only that she suffered a deprivation of her rights under
the Constitution and that this injury was caused by some policylevel decision of the municipality to act or fail to act, but also
that the municipality's action or failure to act was a result of
deliberate indifference to the rights of the plaintiff.1 5 Within
11 Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
12 See David Jacks Achtenburg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2191 (2005).
13 See G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator's View of Discovery and Proof in Police
Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 772 (1999).
14 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
15 Several different avenues are available to demonstrate municipal liability
under Monell. See Jessica R. Manley, A Common Field of Vision: Municipal
Liability for State Law Enforcement and Principles of Federalism in Section
1983 Actions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 971-78 (describing the history of municipal liability under § 1983). Describing each of these avenues in any detail
is beyond the scope of this article. Here, we focus on the basic elements of
liability when the policy involved is a "practice or custom," rather than a
straight-forward expression of policy, as for example, when municipal policy
appears in writing or is expressed through a final policymaker for the municipality. In those circumstances, the requirements for Monell liability are
somewhat less restrictive. Id. at 974 n. 55 (noting that in Monell itself the
policy at issue was a "written, formal policy requiring pregnant employees to
stop working at a certain time, even if it was not medically necessary") (quot-
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each of these elements - proof of policy or custom, causation
and deliberate indifference - lie additional hurdles to liability.
A policy or custom, for example, must be a practice or custom
so widespread and ingrained as to "have the force of law."16
Causation also must be specific to the violation alleged, meaning
that merely proving an unconstitutional policy, practice or custom, however loathsome, will not ensure liability unless the specific injury alleged relates to the specific unconstitutional policy
proved.17 Once each of these elements is met, a plaintiff must
further prove that the unconstitutional policy that caused her
injury was the result of something more than mere negligence
on the part of the City. Instead, the policy must be the result of
deliberate indifference. This is a state of mind that requires a
heightened level of culpability that is even more than mere "indifference."18 In fact, the Monell standard for municipal liability
has been interpreted by scholars as more restrictive than "common law restrict[ions] [on] private employers' liability for punitive damages."

19

ing Karen M. Blum, Municipal Liability Under § 1983, 15 ToURo L. REV.
1535, 1535 (1999)).
16 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
17 Id. at 412 (describing how a sheriff's decision to hire a member of his
family onto the police force, despite a background of known criminal convictions, including assault and battery, cannot form a basis for municipal liability
because nothing about the convictions suggested that the officer would engage in the precise constitutional violations alleged by the plaintiff).
18 Id. at 411 ("Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background
would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious
consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of
a third party's federally protected right can the official's failure to adequately
scrutinize the applicant's background constitute 'deliberate indifference."').
19 See generally Achtenburg, supra note 12, at 2193; see also generally Kevin
R. Vodak, A Plainly Obvious Need for New-Fashioned Municipal Liability:
The DeliberateIndifference Standardand Board of County Commissioners of
Bryan County v. Brown, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 785, 800-07 (Spring 1999), for a
discussion of the difficulties of showing deliberate indifference.
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In addition, merely raising a Monell claim typically invites a
storm of motions from the City. These motions are designed to
whittle away at the plaintiff's right to pursue these claims until
such time as they become so old and so divorced from the remainder of the case that they are ultimately dismissed without
the City having to substantively respond at all. The City's legal
strategy is designed to prevent any public or judicial scrutiny of
its practices - to prevent its practices and their implications
from ever becoming visible.20
This strategy typically begins with a motion to bifurcate discovery of Monell claims from discovery related to the underlying constitutional violation. This is then followed by a motion to
bifurcate the trial of these issues, or, in some cases, dismiss the
Monell claims outright before trial. The City of Chicago has recently augmented this strategy with an additional tool, which it
refers to as a "stipulation," but this in reality functions only as
an agreement to fulfill its statutory duty to indemnify its employees for damages incurred as a result of actions taken in the
course of their employment. Upon filing this stipulation, the
City typically moves to block discovery and trial of its practices,
21
ensuring that its policies will remain unexamined.
B.

Statistical Analysis as a Useful Tool in Overcoming
Barriers to Monell Liability

In the face of such obstacles, how can litigants respond? One
method that we found particularly valuable in Bond involved
using statistical analysis of data obtained from the City itself.
Statistics can be used not only to prove that the City had a policy of failing to supervise and discipline its officers, but also to
20
21

Kalven, supra note 1, at 27.

The propriety of the City's motion has been questioned by a number of

federal judges. See, e.g., G. Flint Taylor, Defending Against Municipal Attempts to Nullify Monell Pattern and Practice Claims: Sample Pleadings, PoLICE MISCONDUCT AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REPORT, 754 Thomson/West
(Sept./Oct. 2006).

Volume 1, Number 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol1/iss2/4

Spring 2008
8

Futterman et al.: The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and

259

Chica.go Police Department's 5roken .Sqstem

establish the causation and deliberate indifference requirements
of a Monell claim. With regard to causation, our analysis demonstrated that if the City had an effective system, it would have
flagged and disciplined the Skullcap Crew before they had a
chance to abuse Diane. However, these officers were encouraged in their belief that they could abuse African Americans with impunity because the City's system of reviewing
complaints against officers was so defective. With regard to deliberate indifference, because our analysis was based on the
City's own data, the City could hardly argue that it was not or
could not have become aware of how ineffective its policies
were in deterring abuse.
While we are certainly not the first lawyers to use this type of
analysis in proving a Moneil claim,22 statistical analysis is not as
prevalent in police misconduct litigation as it is in other areas of
the law, such as employment discrimination, trademark infringement and antitrust.23 The reasons for the reluctance to use statisFlint G. Taylor authored an excellent article on the litigation of policy and
practice cases. See Taylor, supra note 13. Much of the advice given by Taylor
reflects discovery strategies that we used in Bond. For example, Taylor suggests obtaining sustained rates and comparing them to other jurisdictions,
breaking down sustained rates within relevant categories of misconduct, examining ways in which sustained rates may be inflated and obtaining a list of
"repeater beaters." Id. at 754-55, 760.
23 See, e.g., Intl. Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977)
("[O]ur cases make it unmistakably clear that 'statistical analyses have served
and will continue to serve an important role' in cases in which the existence
of discrimination is a disputed issue." (quoting Mayor of Phila. v. Educ.
Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974))); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Both Mobil and Pegasus Petroleum offered surveys of consumers and of members of the oil trading
industry as evidence relating to the existence of actual confusion between the
two marks. The district court properly admitted these surveys into evidence,
despite claims of statistical imperfections by both sides, as those criticisms
affected the weight accorded to the evidence rather than its admissibility."
(citing Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons,
523 F.2d 1331, 1341 (2d Cir. 1975)); In re Indep. Gasoline Antitrust Litig., 79
F.R.D. 552, 561 (D. Md. 1978) (granting class certification because "plaintiffs
have produced some documentary evidence supporting their assertions that
22
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tical tools are undoubtedly varied, but it may be rooted in the
fact that law schools generally do not stress quantitative skills.
Moreover, engaging a statistician or qualified mathematical analyst may seem beyond the reach of an attorney who is independently financing the litigation and hopes to recover a fee at the
end of the case. Again, our aim is to persuade practitioners and
policymakers alike that accurate analysis of a city's own data is
invaluable in assessing the state of its policies and practices.
Before we discuss what we found from our analysis of data
from the City of Chicago, however, we should add a few caveats,
which are related to the limits of statistics-based evidence in
civil rights cases. First, many federal courts have expressed the
view that statistics "alone" will not suffice to prove a Monell
claim.24 This view may be less related to the strength of the conproof of impact on all class members is capable of common proof by statistical and economic analyses of the gasoline market").
24 See generally Stephen M. Ryals, Proof of Municipal Liability in Police
Misconduct Cases, 596 PLI/LIT 7, at *21-22 (1998). See also Strauss v. City of
Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing Monell claim under
the now-defunct "heightened pleading" standard for such claims, because the
plaintiff's citation of low sustained rates from the Office of Professional Standards [the City agency charged with investigating police abuse] "without
more, indicate[d] nothing" because "[p]eople may file a complaint for many
reasons, or for no reason at all"); Woods v. Clay, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 343,
at *61 (D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2005) (granting summary judgment because "[b]y itself,
the fact that the City did not sustain more citizen complaints against its police
officers does not establish a widespread custom of ignoring or improperly
disposing of complaints, and plaintiffs have not shown that the City should
have punished more police officers or that it ignored complaints.. . ."); Glinski v. City of Chicago, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20324, at *9 (D. Ill. Dec. 7,
2001) (granting summary judgment despite plaintiff's evidence that the City
only sustained 0.011% of civil rights violation claims because plaintiff did not
offer any evidence that the not sustained complaints were meritorious);
Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987) (reversing judgment in
favor of plaintiff on Monell claim, in part because the "number of complaints
[cited by plaintiff] bears no relation to their validity"); but see Kerr v. West
Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing statistics on dog
bites in addition to other policy evidence in determining that the City failed
to adequately train canine units). The Second Circuit, in contrast, has at least
held statistical evidence probative of notice. See Fiacco v. Rensselaer, 783
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clusions one can make based on a particular set of data and
more related to the general aversion of the legal profession to
quantitative analysis.

25

The fact remains that this view is en-

trenched in the case law and is not likely to be shaken. Second,
even when courts do consider a statistical analysis on its merits
in assessing a Monell claim, certain barriers to admission of the
evidence must be overcome. Among these barriers are challenges to the relevance of the statistical analysis. These chalF.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Whether or not the claims had validity, the
very assertion of a number of such claims put the City on notice that there
was a possibility that its police officers had used excessive force. The City's
knowledge of these allegations and the nature and extent of its efforts to
investigate and record the claims were pertinent to Fiacco's contention that
the City had a policy of nonsupervision of its policemen that reflected a deliberate indifference to their use of excessive force."). On the other hand,
courts, when presented with statistical analysis, in addition to other evidence,
often respond positively. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F. 3d 966, 975 (3d
Cir. 1996) (reversing judgment as a matter of law in favor of the city. The
court explained that "Bryant, even if it were precedential and/or persuasive,
is distinguishable from the instant case. Beck presented considerably more
than mere statistics. He also presented evidence of actual written civilian
complaints. Further, he presented evidence that the City of Pittsburgh has
no formal system in place for tracking complaints against its officers and that
the citizen complaints were not isolated incidents"); Chew v. Gates, 27 F. 3d
1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence that dogs bit suspects in
40% of cases, coupled with lack of department policies regarding the use of
canine force, could be used to show deliberate indifference); Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F. 2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988) (reversing summary judgment in
favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim that the city had a custom of failing to
protect domestic abuse victims where the arrest rate for nondomestic assault
cases was 31% and the arrest rate for domestic assault cases was 16%. The
court expressly refused to decide whether statistics are sufficient because
"the plaintiff has also presented evidence that ... the training encourages
officers to attempt to 'defuse' the situation and to use arrest as a last resort");
Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1222 (5th Cir. 1982) (testimony
that 75-80% of officers carried "throw down guns" was used along with other
evidence to prove existence of unconstitutional custom), rev'd after rehearing
en banc on other grounds, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1984).
25 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987), in which the statistical evidence of bias in the application of the death penalty was overwhelming, yet a majority of the justices could not bring themselves to rely on this
evidence as a basis to find the death penalty unconstitutional.
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lenges may be based on how closely the particular analysis
tracks the problem raised in the lawsuit,26 how many variables
the analysis attempted to account for 27 and whether the analysis
used is an appropriate baseline or benchmark in assessing the
data in question.28
With these caveats in mind, we turn to what we learned about
the City of Chicago's policies and practices from a mathematical
analysis of its own data.

In Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the
D.C. Circuit upheld a directed verdict in favor of the municipal defendant
despite the following evidence: 92% of officers were exonerated in misconduct investigations over a five-year period, the police chief only disciplined
one of 26 officers cited by a review board for unjustifiably using their weapons, and the chief only took adverse action against five of 21 officers recommended for discipline by a civilian review board. The court explained that
"[tihese statistics are conspicuously wanting in detail. They do not speak for
themselves. The first item, for example, lumps together all investigations of
whatever kind; it tells us nothing separately or specifically about excessive
force complaints." Id. at 124-25.
27 See Watson, 857 F.2d at 695-96 (finding statistical evidence persuasive
despite a failure to control for the relevant factor of probable cause, noting
that while "[g]enerally a failure to account for every variable will affect the
26

weight rather than the admissibility of the statistics ...

in some cases, the

statistics may be so defective as to be inadmissible as irrelevant").
28 See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. Of Educ., 246 F.3d 1073, 107677 (7th Cir. 2001) ("No effort has been made by the plaintiffs, despite our
warnings, to partition, however crudely, the lag in achievement that is due to
the school board's past illegalities and the lag that is due to other factors,
factors for which the school board bears no federal legal responsibility. The
partition could be made by comparing minority academic performance in
Rockford with the performance of minority students in other school districts
after adjusting for the various factors that are not the school board's legal
responsibility yet might be thought to influence the academic performance of
Rockford's minority students, such as poverty, family stability, health, class
size and quality of teachers. There are statistical methods for holding these
factors constant in order to isolate the influence, if any, of the board's illegal
conduct on the academic performance of Rockford's minority students. No
such scientific comparison has been attempted-nor even anything cruder.").
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H.

THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT'S BROKEN
DISCIPLINARY AND SUPERVISORY SYSTEMS 29
A "PORTRAIT OF IMPUNITY"

During the late 1970s and 1980s, numerous African Americans complained about brutal techniques used by police from a
certain command area of the Chicago Police Department. These
techniques involved using a cattle prod, attaching a black box
generating electricity to a man's ears or genitalia, handcuffing
men to burning-hot radiators, suffocating them with plastic bags,
playing sadistic games of Russian Roulette and beating them.
These were among the infamous and widely acknowledged torture acts committed by former police Commander Jon Burge
and his henchmen. 30 Mayor Richard M. Daley and high level
police officials have offered repeated statements of reassurance
that the days of torture are over. That was then. This is now.
That could never happen today, in part due to the Police De31
partment's improved supervisory and monitoring systems.
29

See generally Kalven, supra note 1.

John Conroy has written a series of important and thoughtful articles on
police torture in Chicago, which have been published in the Chicago Reader.
His articles can be accessed from Chicago Reader, available at http://www.
chicagoreader.com/policetorture (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). See also United
States ex. rel. Maxwell v. Gilmore, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
("It is now common knowledge that in the early to mid 1980s Jon Burge and
many officers working under him regularly engaged in the physical abuse and
torture of prisoners to extract confessions. Both internal police accounts and
numerous lawsuits and appeals brought by suspects alleging such abuse substantiate that those beatings and other means of torture occurred as an established practice, not just on an isolated basis."); see generally People v.
Patterson, 192 Ill.2d 93, (Ill. 2000); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233
(7th Cir. 1993); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1997); People v. Cannon, 293 Ill. App. 3d 634, 688 (1st Dist. 1997).
30

31

See, e.g.,

JAMIE KALVEN,

The View From the Ground Portraitof Impu-

nity- Part II, (2006), http://www.viewfromtheground.com/archive/2006/09/
portrait-of-impunity-part2.html (quoting Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and
Police Superintendent Phil Cline about the series of safeguards that have
been put in place since the Burge era to prevent police torture).
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But is that really true? In light of our experiences on the
ground and the reports of rampant abuse by the Skullcap Crew,
have the underlying conditions that allowed Burge and his
henchmen to torture African American men with impunity really been addressed by the City of Chicago? Are the Skullcap
Crew and other groups that operate in similar neighborhoods
not only present day Burges, but also the inevitable result of
persistent fundamental problems that continue to go unaddressed? Below, we analyze the Chicago Police Department's
data to shed some light on possible answers to these questions.
A.

The CPD Data Sets

Our analysis in this article draws primarily from three statistical data sets, each originating from the Chicago Police
Department.
First, we studied a series of Chicago disciplinary data. The
CPD produced disciplinary data related to all civilian abuse
complaints over a six-year period (1999 to 2004) in each of the
following categories - excessive force/brutality, illegal searches,
racial abuse, sexual abuse and false arrests (e.g., planting evidence). We highlight the period surrounding the charged abuse
of Diane (2002 to 2004). By organizing the data in this way, we
were able to break down the data by type of charged abuse, as
well as to aggregate the information to look at the most serious
forms of civilian abuse as a whole.
Second, we examined a random sample of the investigative
files from the same five categories of civilian abuse complaints
and examined every available investigative file relating to misconduct charges brought against the five officers charged with
abusing Diane.
Third, we analyzed the distribution of misconduct complaints
among Chicago police officers. We paid special attention to the
data regarding Chicago police officers who amassed 11 or more
official misconduct complaints in a five-year period from 2001 to
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2006.32 We call this the "repeater" data set. The repeater data
listed the complaints against those officers and noted each officer's unit of assignment, designating where they worked. For
each complaint, we considered the date of the complaint, the
results of the City's internal investigation and the nature of any
discipline recommended by the arm of the Department that investigated the charge. We also evaluated data concerning the
Chicago Police Department's early warning programs.
Our analysis below is also informed by years of work with
people in the Stateway Gardens public housing community. This
ethnographic work - our observations and interviews over
years at Stateway - provided additional information which
gave fuller meaning to the statistics.
B.

CPD DisciplinaryRates

The CPD's own data clarify that Chicago police officers can
perpetrate abuse without fear of consequence. The CPD data
reveal that discipline for the abuse of a civilian is rare. The odds
are two in 1000 that a Chicago police officer will receive any
meaningful discipline as a result of being charged with abusing a
civilian. 33 Two in 1000.
Between 2002 and 2004, civilians filed 10,149 complaints of
excessive force, illegal searches, racial abuse, sexual abuse and
false arrests. 34 We limited the disciplinary data set to those five
While there is no consensus among police practices experts about the
number of citizen complaints that ought to trigger intervention or special
monitoring by a department, we chose the arbitrarily high number of 11 or
more complaints over five years, because there would be little controversy
that any Department that is competently monitoring its personnel would
have flagged an officer with more than ten official misconduct complaints in
that time span.
33 See Table 1. Craig Futterman, Chicago Police Department Abuse Data
(2007) (using Chicago Police Department data on officer misconduct investigations) (unpublished report, on file with the author at the University of Chicago Law School).
34 Id.
32
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categories, because they encompass the most serious forms of
civilian abuse and correspond to the types of abuse endured by
Diane. Only 19 of the 10,149 complaints led to a suspension of a
week or more. 35 The statistics revealed that:
" The chance of meaningful discipline for a police brutality
complaint was less than 3 in 1000.
" Only 1 of 3837 charged illegal searches led to meaningful
discipline.
" Not a single charge of false arrest (planting drugs, guns,
etc.) over this three-year period led to an incident of
meaningful discipline.
Table 1, Meaningfully Sustained Rates of C.R. Investigations
from 2002 to 2004, by Type of Offense, illustrates the probability
36
of meaningful discipline for each category of civilian abuse.

Id.
Dr. Steven Whitman worked with us as a mathematical expert in the Bond
case. He collaborated with us in developing the statistical analyses, tables
and graphs in this article. As a part of his consultation, he authored a statistical report, parts of which are subject to a protective order and thus not available to the public. Dr. Steven Whitman, Chicago Police Department
Statistical Report (Nov. 2006) (unpublished report, on file with the author at
the University of Chicago Law School). Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow, the
federal judge who oversaw the Bond case, lifted the protective order over the
City of Chicago's objection, because the court found that information about
charges of official misconduct against police officers were matters of public
concern. The City of Chicago has appealed the court's release of the information. See Bond v. Utreras, 2007 WL 2003085 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2007).
35
36
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TABLE

1. MEANINGFULLY SUSTAINED RATES OF C.R.
INVESTIGATIONS FROM 2002 TO
BY TYPE OF OFFENSE

2004,

Meaningfully
2002-2004

Sustained

Total

MS Rate

Brutality

15

5357

0.0028

Illegal Search

1

3837

0.0003

Sexual Harassment, Abuse, Rape

2

111

0.0180

Racial Abuse

1

183

0.0055

Planting Evidence, False Arrest

0

661

0

Total

19

10,149

0.0019

95% CI for Meaningful Sustained Total Rate (0.0019) = (0.001031, 0.002713)

In reality, the odds are much lower than two in 1000. Only a
small fraction of people who believe that they have been abused
by the police actually file a complaint with the Chicago Police
Department. Among the reasons Stateway Garden residents
gave for not reporting are fear of reprisal and distrust of the
investigatory process. Abuse victims realize that there is only a
slim chance their complaint will be sustained and so they are
understandably reluctant to risk retaliation. These fears are exacerbated by the vulnerability of victims of police abuse.
A national survey of police contacts conducted by the U.S.
Department of Justice found that only one in ten people who
believe that they have been abused by the police ever report the
abuse. 37 The Department of Justice research applied to the Chicago data indicates that meaningful discipline results in only two
out of every 10,000 incidents in which civilians believe that they
J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT,
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 210296, COMPLAINTS ABOUT POLICE USE OF
FORCE 1 (June 2006) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ccpuf.
37 MATHEW

U.S.

pdf.
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have been abused. As Dr. Whitman summarized, "This is pretty
38
close to never."
C.

Sustained Rates

We then examined the 2002 to 2004 "sustained rates," the percentage of cases where the CPD found that sufficient evidence
existed to believe that the charged abuse occurred. We obtained
data for each of the five categories of civilian abuse noted in
Section A, above.
The overall sustained rate for all categories of civilian abuse
charges was only 1% (124 sustained cases out of 10,149 charges
of abuse).39
" Brutality cases were also reportedly sustained at the rate
of 1%.
" Illegal search charges were sustained at the rate of 0.3%,
or 3 in 1000.
* False arrest charges were sustained at the rate of 0.6%, or
6 in 1000.
" Race abuse cases were sustained a little more than 1% of
the time.
" Sexual abuse charges were sustained at the rate of nearly
20%.40
Chicago's reported sustained rates are detailed in Table 2: Sustained Rates of C.R. Investigationsfrom 2002 to 2004, by Type of
Offense.

See Whitman, supra note 36.
39 See Table 2. Futterman, supra note 33.
40 While the sex abuse numbers were based on a relatively small sample, the
higher rate appears to hold true over time. We did not have the opportunity
to test various hypotheses which may explain the higher sustained rate for
this category of abuse. This statistic invites further study.
38
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2.

SUSTAINED RATES OF

2002

TO

2004,

C.R.

INVESTIGATIONS FROM

BY TYPE OF OFFENSE

2002-2004

Sustained

Total

SU Rate

Brutality

82

5357

0.0153

Illegal Search

13

3837

0.0034

Sexual Harassment, Abuse, Rape

22

111

0.1982

Racial Abuse

3

183

0.0164

Planting Evidence, False Arrest

4

661

0.0061

124

10,149

0.0122

Total

95% CI for Sustained Total Rate (0.0122) = (0.0101, 0.0144)

While these rates are certainly low, we wanted to compare
them to certain benchmarks in order to better assess whether
the City's rates had improved over time, as implied by the City's
assurances that the Burge torture chamber could not exist today. We also compared Chicago with other large U.S. cities.
When we looked at Chicago's sustained rates over time, we
found that, in contrast to the claims of Mayor Daley and Superintendent Phil Cline that the CPD disciplinary systems have
been cured since the Burge torture era, sustained rates for brutality and other serious charges of civilian abuse dramatically
dropped by 90% from 1999 to 2004.41 Over that six-year period,
the CPD's reported sustained rate in brutality cases declined
from about 5% in 1999 to less than 0.5% by 2004, with incremental decreases each year. 42 The sustained rate for all serious
civilian abuse charges dropped by about the same amount.
Figures 1 and 2 provide graphic illustrations of this precipitous
43
downward trend.
41

See Figure 1. Futterman, supra note 33.

42

Id.

A confidential source shared the Chicago disciplinary data for 2006 with
the authors. The downward spiral appears to have continued.
43
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FIGURE 1.
PERCENT SUSTAINED COMPLAINTS BY YEAR:
BRUTALITY
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FIGURE 2.
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After examining Chicago data over time, we then compared
Chicago to other major metropolitan police departments. The
Bureau of Justice Statistics, as a part of the Department of Justice's obligations under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,44 collected excessive force complaint
numbers and sustained rates from police departments comprised
of 100 or more sworn police officers. While few police departments are known for effectively policing themselves, Chicago is,
on a number of accountability measures, significantly worse
than the norm. As Dr. Whitman observed, "Chicago force complaint data seem out of line with the national profile with sus' 45
tained rates, being far lower than for the country as a whole.
The average sustained rate for excessive force cases in major
metropolitan police departments was 8%, compared to Chicago's 0.48% in 2004, the most recent year in our data set. 46 A
brutality complaint is thus 94% less likely to be sustained in Chicago than in the nation as a whole. 47 See Figure 3, Sustained Excessive Force Complaints in U.S. and Chicago.
FIGURE

3

Sustained Excessive Force Complaints in U.S. and
Chicago
8%
% Sustained in US (2002)*
0.48%
% Sustained in Chicago (2004)
16.7
Ratio
That is, an excessive force complaint is 16.7 times more
likely to be sustained in the United States than in Chicago.
*Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, June 2006, NCJ 210296,
entitled "Citizen Complaints about Police Use of Force" (page 1).
42 U.S.C.A. § 14142 (West 1994).
Whitman, supra note 36.
46 Hickman, supra note 37.
47 See Figure 3. Futterman, supra note 33.
44
45
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Comparisons with Department of Justice statistics also
showed that the Chicago Police Department received substantially more brutality complaints per officer than the national average. The national average among "large municipal police
departments" (1000 or more officers) was 9.5 excessive force
complaints per 100 full-time sworn officers. 48 We would therefore expect 1283 complaints per year against Chicago's 13,500
officers. However, from 1999 to 2004, citizens filed approximately 1774 brutality complaints per year against Chicago police
9
officers.4
We then compared CPD excessive force and sustained rate
data with that of law enforcement agencies that the U.S. Department of Justice found, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141, to have
engaged in a pattern and practice of excessive force and had
deficient disciplinary systems for addressing brutality complaints.50 These agencies include Detroit, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Miami, Cleveland and Pittsburgh. We obtained the
2002 excessive force and sustained rate data for each of these
agencies, as reported to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Some
of the agencies listed above had begun to remediate their systems under federal consent decrees by 2002, complicating our
attempts to make good comparisons. Albeit imperfect, our preliminary review showed that Chicago's internal brutality and
disciplinary data were substantially worse than cities where the
Department of Justice had already concluded there were serious
problems. 51

48

Hickman, supra note 37

Futterman, supra note 33.
The Department of Justice's findings are available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/split/police.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
51 Gabriel Baird, Cleveland Police Always Justify Using Force, THE PLAIN
49
50

Jan. 14, 2007, at Al. The one exception was Cleveland, where not
one of nearly 4500 brutality complaints was sustained over a four-year
period.
DEALER,

Volume 1, Number 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol1/iss2/4

.Spring2008
22

Futterman et al.: The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and
7A

Chicaqgo Police Department'5 broken Sq5tem

As infinitesimal as the CPD's reported sustained and disciplinary rates are, there are strong reasons to believe that the actual
rates are even lower.
First, in our review of random samples of excessive force complaints, we discovered that the City counts complaints that were
sustained for administrative violations (but not brutality) as sustained force complaints for statistical purposes. This biased reporting method accounted for about half of the sustained force
complaints in the sample, grossly inflating CPD's sustained
numbers. 52 In other words, the CPD failed to sustain excessive
force charges in about half of the cases that it reports as
sustained.
Second, multiple layers of review occur after the investigative
arms of the CPD recommend discipline. Disciplinary findings
may be overturned or reduced by police supervisors up the
chain of command. In addition, the Chicago Police Board, a
group of individuals appointed by Mayor Daley to review sustained complaints of police misconduct, reversed sustained findings or reduced discipline in nearly 50% of the cases that it
reviewed.5 3 Thus, the real sustained and disciplinary rates ap-

pear to be far lower than reported in this article.
D.

Shoddy Investigations

"If the Chicago Police Department investigated
street crime the way that it investigates police abuse,
it would never solve a case." - Joseph Stine, former
Executive Officer of the Police Training Bureau
for the City of Philadelphia.5 4
Futterman, supra note 33.
Legal Defense Handbook, Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7
11-12 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.chicagofop.org/Legal-Defense/LD
_Book_090105.pdf.
54 Telephone interview with Joseph Stine, consultant (Nov. 2006). Joseph
Stine also consulted with u§ as a police practices and investigations expert in
the Bond case. He provided invaluable insights around the CPD's practices
52
53
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We studied a sample of investigative files of Chicago civilian
abuse complaints to examine the Department's investigative
procedures in practice and to gain a better understanding of why
only two in 1000 charges of civilian abuse result in meaningful
discipline. Are there systemic problems with the manner in
which police misconduct complaints are investigated in
Chicago?
We found that standard CPD police abuse investigations violate virtually every canon of professional investigation. For example, professional investigations demand that investigators
promptly respond to the scene. When investigators arrive, they
protect the scene, seeking to preserve all physical evidence to
avoid contamination. They collect and test the evidence. They
thoroughly canvass the area and attempt to identify witnesses
and potential suspects. They conduct face-to-face interviews
with persons who may have pertinent information related to the
crime. It is universally accepted that investigators should try to
interview witnesses separately, as soon as possible after the incident, to avoid the tainting of memories (innocent or otherwise)
and opportunities for collusion. Face-to-face interviews are also
essential to observe the subject's demeanor and to ask follow-up
questions that arise from witness narratives, as well as from
comparisons to the stories of other witnesses/suspects and physi55
cal evidence in the case.
Imagine a rape or beating takes place. The victim identifies
her attacker. Detectives wait weeks if not months before they
even attempt to contact the suspect. When they do, they send
the alleged perpetrator a written form informing him of the substance of the allegations, the names of the witnesses, and the
for investigating police abuse in Chicago, which are also reflected in this article. Like Dr. Whitman, Stine drafted an expert report pursuant to Rule

26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Aspects of Stine's report
are also unavailable due to the protective order, currently being reviewed by

the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
55

See

PAUL

B.

WESTON AND KENNETH

TIONS BASIC PERSPECTIVES,

M.

WELLS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-

New Jersey (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1970).
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time, place and circumstances of the crime. The Department
then tells the accused to take a week, sometimes two, three or
even more weeks, to file a one-paragraph denial of the charges,
which is then accepted without question as to whether the accused has talked to any other witnesses or colluded with any
other suspects in drafting the denial.
These are not hypothetical or aberrational practices. These
are the CPD's standard procedures when it comes to investigating police misconduct. In more than 85% of the CPD police
abuse investigations analyzed, the accused officer was never
even interviewed. 56 In many of the remaining 15% of the investigations, the Department determined that the complaint was
not sustained without ever requesting any information from any
of the officers on the scene. 57 In the instances in which the
charged officer was contacted by an investigator, the contact
usually occurred months after the incident. The officer was then
provided with the specifics of the charges, including the name of
the complainant and victims, and given, on average, an additional seven to ten days to return a brief "To/From" report, generally denying the allegations. In some cases, the charged officer
took longer than a month to respond to the charges.5 8 The
months-long delay between the incident and required response
from the accused creates opportunities for collusion. It was not
uncommon to see a group of officers submit nearly verbatim responses, even mimicking the same typographical errors. Following the receipt of these form denials, the complaints were almost
invariably not sustained by the Department.
Investigators rarely conducted canvasses or even visited the
scene of the incident. Physical evidence was not preserved,
much less tested. Recordings of 911 calls of police abuse were
routinely destroyed. 59 Police and civilian witnesses were rarely
Futterman, supra note 33.
57 Id.
58 Id.
56

59

Id.
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interviewed in person. 60 While investigators frequently ran background checks on civilian complainants and witnesses who corroborated police abuse, they did not consider the complaint
histories of any Chicago police officer involved in the
investigation.61
In view of the CPD's standard practices in official misconduct
investigations, it is no wonder that 998 out of 1000 charges of
police abuse in Chicago never lead to any real discipline.
E. A Few Bad Apples?
Some tend to describe the problem of police abuse as one of a
"few bad apples." Authors of a recent research paper for the
National Institute of Justice observed, "[i]t has become a truism
among police chiefs that 10% of their officers cause 90% of
their problems." 62 Chicago is no exception.63
Our research supports the proposition that the vast majority
of Chicago police officers are not abusive. The research also
lends credence to the "truism" that a small percentage of the
force commits most of the reported abuse in the City. The data,
however, do not support the assertion that the problem is simply
attributable to a few bad apples. The data instead paint a picture
of an institution with a deeply ingrained culture of denial that
enables certain officers to operate with impunity in certain communities within the City. The CPD goes to great lengths not to
60

Id.

We will discuss the Department's failures to address patterns of abuse
more fully in Section II.D, infra.
62 Samuel Walker, Geoffrey Alpert, and Dennis Kenney, Early Warning Systems: Responding to the Problem Police Officer, DOJ NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF, July 2001, at 1.
63 See Kalven, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting CPD Superintendent Cline:
"We'll use all our resources to go after police officers who engage in misconduct. They are giving a black eye to the majority, the 90% of the cops that go
out there every day and put their life on the line to keep this city safe.").
61
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know about or address its bad apples or the harm that they inflict on the police, public and justice system.
While the vast majority of the force has not collected an extraordinary number of complaints, this does not mean that the
CPD bears no responsibility for the state of police impunity in
Chicago. The police code of silence contributes to the Department's machinery of denial. Veteran Chicago police abuse investigators and officers consistently report that they are not aware
of a single instance in which a Chicago police officer reported
having observed a fellow officer abuse a civilian. While there
may be a number of good reasons why good officers fail to report abuse (including the risk to their personal safety and careers), it is an inescapable fact that this type of whistle-blowing
is virtually nonexistent in Chicago. The Department acts as a
catalyst to this phenomenon by refusing to transfer and protect
64
whistle-blowers as a matter of policy.
1.

The CPD Fails to Address Patterns of Abuse

We found that the vast majority of Chicago police officers are
not abusive. Approximately 80% of the force received three or
fewer complaints in the five-year period examined.65 It appears
that many officers have zero or one complaint throughout the
bulk of their careers. 66 The expected median is 1.5 complaints.67
Less than 5% of the Department account for nearly half of all
abuse complaints against the CPD.68 Indeed, 662 Chicago police
64

An in-depth analysis of the police code of silence is beyond the scope of

this article. See Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17 (2000);
Jerome H. Skolnick, Prosecuting Police Brutality Requires Penetrating the
Blue Wall of Silence, AMERICAN PROSPEcr, Mar. 27, 2000; Jeffes v. Barnes,

208 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2000); Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923 (5th Cir.
1999), for commentary and examples of cases on the subject.
65
66
67
68

Futterman, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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officers, a little less than 5% of the CPD's 13,500 member force,
amassed 11 or more official misconduct complaints between
2001 and 2006.69 We call these officers "repeaters." Because the
vast majority of officers get only a few complaints in their entire
careers, it is easy to identify those who may be engaged in a
pattern of abusive behavior. They literally jump off the page.
Figure 4, Complaints Against Chicago Police Officers, 2001 to
2006, illustrates the distribution of complaints among Chicago
70
police officers.
FIGURE 4.
COMPLAINTS AGAINST CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS,

2001-2006
12,000 1
10,387
10,000
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Number of Officers

6000
4000
2451
2000
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0
0 to 3

4 to 10

11 or more

Number of Complaints

Yet, the CPD refuses to look at or allow others to look at
patterns of abuse complaints.71 The CPD chooses not to know
Id.
We believe that many of the officers in the second category (four to ten
complaints) should have been flagged for watchful monitoring. Heightened
scrutiny, monitoring and intervention ought to occur long before an officer
has accumulated 11 or more abuse complaints.
71 The Department is currently engaged in a court battle to prevent members of the press or public from learning the identities of the officers who
have been charged with the most abuse in Chicago. The City is also fighting
the release of the complaint histories and redacted investigative files of the
69
70
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- avoiding critical self-examination and public and judicial
72
scrutiny of its practices.
Once the veil is lifted, the Department's own data clarify that
the CPD lacks any effective system to address patterns of abuse.
A complaint against a repeater officer is no more likely to lead
to meaningful discipline than a complaint against the 80% of
Chicago officers who do not accumulate abuse complaints. A
repeater can be 99.8% confident that no meaningful investigation or discipline will result from being charged with the abuse
of a civilian. In other words, the probability is just 0.2% that
reported abuse will lead to meaningful discipline of an officer
who has earned 11 or more abuse complaints in the last five
years. 73 Seventy-five percent of the repeaters have not received
74
discipline of any kind whatsoever.
The City's early warning programs demonstrate a dismal record of identifying repeat abusers. While the City represents
that it has long had in place an early warning system to identify
officers who may be engaged in problematic behavior, only 13%
75
of the repeaters have enrolled in its early warning programs.
Nearly 90% have never even been flagged. 76 There were officers
who had amassed more than 50 abuse complaints within five
years who had not, as of the time the data was obtained, been

five officers charged with abusing Diane. See Bond, supra note 36; Frank
Main and Abdon M. Pallasch, What are they hiding? Chicago Police List of
Officers with More than 10 Complaints Remains a Secret, CHICAGO SUNTIMES, July 17, 2007, at 3.
72 The City's primary legal strategy in Monell policy cases has been to use
any means at its disposal to avoid discovery or litigation of its policies and
practices, thereby averting any scrutiny of its practices. See Section I.B. and
Taylor, supra note 21, for a fuller discussion of the City's legal tactics.
73 There were only 22 incidents of meaningful discipline out of 10,733 abuse
charges against these, repeaters.
74 Futterman, supra note 33.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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flagged by any of the CPD's early warning programs, much less
77
disciplined in any fashion.
There were 33 Chicago police officers with 30 or more complaints between 2001 and 2006.78 Only one out of more than
1000 charges of abuse against those 33 officers ever led to meaningful discipline. 79 Figure 5 illustrates the number of sustained
charges against officers with 30 complaints within the recent
five-year period. More than half of these officers with more than
30 abuse complaints had never even been flagged for early intervention or monitoring.80
FIGURE 5: "REPEATERS"

33 CPD members had 30 or more complaints. Note these pairs
containing complaints and sustained complaints:
(30,0)
(33,1)
(31,0)
(31,0)
(34,0)
(40,0)
(33,0)

(33,0)
(50,2)
(32,0)
(30,0)
(55,0)
(38,0)
(31,0)

(30,0)
(30,0)
(53,1)
(30,0)
(33,0)
(35,0)
(33,0)

(31,0)
(52,0)
(31,0)
(30,0)
(30,1)
(30,0)

(36,1)
(30,0)
(34,0)
(36,1)
(31,0)
(35,0)

Police officials have to work incredibly hard not to know
about repeat offenders. While police can generate this repeater
data with only a few key strokes from a police computer, the
police choose not to analyze the data. Our discovery requests in
the Bond litigation and court orders to enforce those requests
prompted the creation of the repeater data. No one in the CPD
ever sought to generate this easily accessible and revealing information. The police officer in charge of the CPD complaint
78

Id.
Id.

79

Id.

80

Id.

77
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database reported that neither the superintendent nor any other
police official had ever asked for or received repeater data that
identifies the officers who have been the source of the most
abuse charges in Chicago. 81 In contrast to the standard practice
of running background checks of individuals in minor traffic
stops, the acting Chief Administrator of the CPD's Office of
Professional Standards, a man with a quarter century of experience investigating police abuse misconduct in Chicago, reported
only five or fewer occasions in which the CPD ever looked up
the complaint history of an individual officer as part of an official police misconduct investigation.82
2.

The CPD's "Early" Interventions with
Repeaters Are Ineffective

CPD early warning interventions appear to have little if any
effect on the behavior of officers who have accumulated 11 or
more misconduct charges within five years. Drawing on the rare
occasions when the City actually flagged a repeater for intervention, we conducted a statistical analysis to assess the efficacy of
the CPD's early warning programs. We analyzed the repeaters'
complaint patterns before and after the intervention to determine whether the CPD's interventions were making any difference in behavior.
Many of the repeaters collected more abuse complaints after
having participated in the City's programs. Officers who were
flagged by the City as needing intervention averaged 2.6 complaints per year after they completed their program or class. 83 If
their post-intervention behavior remained consistent, they
would average 13 abuse complaints over five years. Fourteen officers averaged more than five complaints per year, four aver81 Daniel Kivel Dep., Aug. 31, 2006, Bond v. Utreras, et al., No. 04-cv-2617
(N.D. I11.Mar. 23, 2007).
82 Michael Duffy Dep., Aug. 29, 2006, Bond v. Utreras, et al., No. 04-cv-2617
(N.D. I1l. Mar. 23, 2007).
83 Futterman, supra. note 33.
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aged more than seven and one averaged 9.3 complaints per
year.84 As Dr. Whitman observed, "these programs not only appear ineffective but also appear not to produce results better
than having no programs."85
Equally problematic, the Department's early warning programs are not designed to protect the public. Mary Conley, the
police commander who oversaw the CPD programs, explained
that the motivation for the placement of officers in these programs is to preserve the Department's investment in these officers.86 While rehabilitation of officers is undoubtedly a worthy
goal, the Department should also be concerned with identifying
and weeding out officers who routinely abuse the public. None
of the CPD's current or contemplated early warning programs,
however, incorporate any investigatory or disciplinary component. Indeed, the CPD has repeatedly emphasized that the Department will not use its early identification system as an
investigative or disciplinary tool.87 In other words, a pattern of
abuse complaints cannot, under CPD procedures, lead to an investigation into an officer's conduct. Thus, if the CPD were
somehow successful in identifying an individual or group of officers who were engaged in a pattern of brutality or corruption,
it would not deploy any resources to investigate those patterns,
much less anything resembling a sting or undercover operation
that has proven effective in federal investigations of police misconduct. 88 The CPD would simply offer the suspected brutal or
84

Id.

Whitman, supra note 36.
Mary Conley Dep., Aug. 25, 2006, Bond v. Utreras, et al., No. 04-cv-2617
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2007).

85

86
87

See Andrew Hermann, Computer System to Track Cops' Performance,

Apr. 15, 2006, at 5 (quoting police Superintendent Phil
Cline that (early) warnings will not trigger disciplinary action but instead
counseling and perhaps additional training). As an aside, the long announced computer system to monitor police performance referred to in the
title has never been implemented.
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,

See Jeff Coen and David Heinzmann, Retrial Bid Pinned on Cops' Misconduct, CHI. TRIB., July 17, 2005, at 1; Rudolph Bush, Officer Pleads Guilty in
88
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corrupt officer counseling or a class, putting him on notice that
he needs to cover his tracks. While such interventions may make
sense in response to other problematic behavior (e.g., substance
abuse, attendance problems, complaints of verbal abuse, etc.),
they are inappropriate to address potential patterns of serious
abuse or other criminal conduct. It makes little sense to offer
counseling to an officer that the CPD has reason to believe is
stealing money, engaging in a drug conspiracy or beating innocent people. These patterns require aggressive, proactive investigations, followed by meaningful action in meritorious cases.
3.

The CPD Refuses to Examine Group Patterns

CPD complaint data confirm that police abuse is a highly concentrated and patterned phenomenon. Abuse is not evenly (or
randomly) distributed throughout the city. In addition to individual patterns, there are patterns of abuse committed by
groups of officers. And these patterns do not just involve particular groups of officers; they focus on particular victims. Abuse is
concentrated among certain officers who work together in particular units or teams and who police certain parts of the City generally lower-income African American and Latino
communities.
Chicago police officers usually work as partners and with a
team of officers who report to a sergeant. In accordance with
the maxim "birds of a feather," good officers do not generally
want to work with officers who abuse their power. Moreover, it
is difficult for a repeater to perpetrate abuse without at least the
silent complicity of his or her partner and other team members.
Yet, the CPD has no system for tracking abuse complaints
among groups of officers. Again, the Department and City officials choose not to know.
Fake Raids, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 2006, at 1, for examples of federal investigations of police misconduct in Chicago.
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We analyzed the repeater data to see how various CPD units
compared. 89 Two units, in particular, jumped off the page as containing a disproportionate share of repeaters - the Special Operations Section and Public Housing South Unit of the CPD.
Both units policed predominantly low-income minority communities in Chicago.
Special Operations is an elite unit of officers deployed in hot
spots, or high crime, economically depressed communities, such
as Chicago public housing developments. Special Operations
contained 64 repeaters who collectively received 1343 abuse
complaints over five years. 90 It should have come as no surprise
to the CPD when seven members of the Special Operations Section were recently indicted for a pattern of criminal abuse, and
more are currently under investigation.91 However, the conduct
of the special operation officers did not come to light as a result
of the analysis or identification of a pattern of abuse complaints
against them. 92 They were instead identified virtually by happenstance when members of the local prosecutor's office noticed
that they were failing to come to court as witnesses in criminal
drug prosecutions. 93 While officers have reported in confidence
that the reputations of many of the indicted officers were well
known among Chicago police officers and supervisors for years,
no one took any action to stop them. The CPD's monitoring and
disciplinary systems not only ensured that their crimes would go
unaddressed, but actually enabled these crimes and abuses to
continue.
The CPD documents containing the repeater lists and units of assignment
(with names redacted) are available at http://www.viewfromtheground.com/
wp-content/media/police-docs/sustained-penalty-codes.pdf and http://www.
viewfromtheground.com/wp-content/media/police-docs/police-officers-morethan-10-crs-unit-175.pdf.
90 Futterman, supra note 33.
91 See David Heinzmann, Anglea Rozas, and Gary Washburn, Elite Cops
Rack Up Complaints, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2007, at 1.
92 See David Heinzmann, Todd Lightly and Jeff Coen, Feds Join in Probe of
City's Elite Police, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 16, 2007, at 1.
89

93

Memo Sheds New Light on SOS Probe, CHI. TRIB., March 17, 2008, at 8.
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Public Housing South (PHS) officers policed public housing
developments on the South Side of Chicago. Even though PHS
was one of the smaller units of the CPD, consisting of a little
more than half the number of police officers as most districts, it
was home to 50 repeaters with 834 abuse complaints within the
same five-year period between 2001 to 2006. 94 Those 50 repeat9
ers made up 18% of the entire PHS unit. 5
To put this in perspective, we compared the number of PHS
repeaters to the number of repeaters assigned to the Second
District, a large geographically-based police station that contained a significant portion of the public housing communities
that made up Public Housing South. After eliminating the repeaters that transferred to the Second District when the PHS
unit was disbanded, there were four repeaters in the unit, making up 0.9% of the Second District. 96 PHS, therefore, was 20
times more likely to have repeaters than the Second District,
even though the units policed many of the same communities.
By comparison, most CPD units housed just one to two repeaters in the entire unit. There is virtually no statistical chance that
the Public Housing (or Special Operations) repeater distributions were caused by random occurrence.
We then examined the abuse complaints against the group of
five PHS officers who were charged with the repeated abuse of
Diane, described in the Introduction to this piece. There were
obvious patterns among the complaints levied against the team.
Moreover, the five officers accumulated together more complaints than repeaters in 33 entire units of the CPD. 97 The
probability that five officers selected at random would each
have amassed the number of complaints as the individual members of the Skullcap Crew was less than one in 2 billion. And
these five officers worked together. It was essentially impossible
94
95
96
97

Futterman, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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for such a grouping of multiple complaints per officer to occur
by chance. Yet, because the CPD did not perform any pattern
analysis by group, Diane's charged tormentors were never identified or stopped. Once again, it required the operation of the
machinery of denial for the CPD not to know about the Skullcap Crew.
The necessity to track potential group patterns of abuse is old
news to the CPD. The patterns of abuse have been apparent in
every major police scandal over the past few decades. It was apparent in the infamous torture of African Americans in the
1970s and 1980s by Commander Burge and his fellow detectives
at Area Two Headquarters when, like now, there were scores of
torture complaints without any attempt by the CPD to meaningfully investigate. It was also the subject of Mayor Daley's Commission Report on Police Integrity in Chicago, authored a
decade ago, in the wake of the federal indictment and later conviction of ten police officers for having engaged in years of corruption and abuse. 98 The report observed that the police
scandals that animated the study did not involve ten officers
from ten different units randomly distributed throughout the
City.99 These Austin and Gresham scandals involved groups of
officers from two gang and drug tactical units on the City's
South and West Sides. The Mayor's Commission admonished
that the CPD must monitor misconduct complaints by police
groups if it hoped to avert similar patterns of abuse in the future. 1°° Like Burge and his crew, the Austin and Gresham officers attracted eye-popping numbers of complaints, but CPD's
disciplinary or supervisory systems never identified them. 0 1
98

Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois, Chicago,

Report of the Commission on Police Integrity, presented to Chicago Mayor
Richard M. Daley 10-11 (Nov. 1997), available at http://www.viewfromthe
ground.com/wp-content/media/kirby-letter/police-integrity-report-1997.pdf.
99 Id.
100 Id.

at 21.

101 See David Jackson, Problems Plague InternalAffairs Division: Forbidden

Friendships Between Cops and Criminals, CHI.
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Similar patterns hold for the later high profile federal prosecutions of a crime ring led by Chicago police sergeant Joe
Miedzenowski, whom the United States Attorney called "the
most corrupt cop" in Chicago history.10 2 The team of officers led
by Miedzenowski was never identified by CPD's procedures,
prior to the federal sting. 103 Nor was a group of tactical officers
from the Englewood district on Chicago's South Side who are
now doing time in federal prison for years of civilian abuse.
They had similarly accumulated a shocking number of complaints without any meaningful investigation or repercussions.104
Despite decades of known patterns of abuse among groups of
10 5
officers, the CPD lacks any system to address group patterns.
4.

The Costs of a Few Bad Apples

Make no mistake, a few bad apples can do untold damage to a
community. It may also be a gross misnomer. Indeed, as demonstrated by the figures above, there are far more than a few bad
apples clustered in certain neighborhoods. Indeed, 50 repeaters
made up nearly 20% of the primary unit that policed public
Todd Lightly and Matt O'Connor, Rogue Cop Gets Life, Drug Ring
Leader Called Betrayer of Society, Honest Police, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2003, at
1; Carol Marin and Frank Main, Honored Cop Among 8 Tied to Thefts, CHI102

CAGO SUN-TIMES,

Aug. 31, 2006, at 6.

Federal law enforcement agents attempted to report Miedzenowski's
abuse. Rather than punish Miedzenowski, the CPD deployed its investigative machinery to retaliate against the agents for reporting the abuse. See
Jeff Coen, $10 Million Dollar Reward in Cop Case: ATF Agents Sued City,
Corrupt Officer Over Retaliation, Harassing, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 2007, at 3.
104 Coen and Heinzmann, supra note 88; Frank Main, 'They're Scum': 2 Chicago Cops Allegedly Helped Robbers Knock Over Businesses Across the City
and Suburbs by Supplying Info About Their Targets and Their Families, CHI103

CAGO SUN-TIMES,

Aug. 23, 2007, at 14.

The CPD has been praised for developing technology to track patterns of
civilian crime. See Richard Pastore, GrandAward Winner Chicago Police Department Using I. T. to Fight Crime, CIO, Feb. 15, 2004. The irony in CPD's
recognition of the value of tracking patterns in civilian crime, but refusal to
look at patterns of police misconduct cannot be ignored.
105
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housing communities on Chicago's South Side.106 Assuming that
any officer, no matter what his or her outlook is on the job,
would prefer to work with partners or team members who share
that outlook, we can surmise that officers who engage in routine
abuse likewise seek out and often work together with likeminded officers. Together these teams of repeaters and their enablers become the cruel and corrupt face of law enforcement for
1
an entire community. 07
Recall that just the first four indicted Special Operations officers alone were responsible for hundreds of arrests. Consider
the number of African Americans in prison based on the testimony and abusive practices of these four officers. The social cost
of the conduct of these few bad apples is staggering: families
made homeless by One Strike evictions from public housing, 0 8
the human suffering from the brutality at the hands of those
four men, the loss of faith in the police and our criminal justice
system and the costs of civil lawsuits to taxpayers. The harm
caused by these four officers continues to accumulate. The Cook
County State's Attorney's Office recently dismissed more than
100 pending felony criminal cases that relied on these officers'

Futterman, supra note 33.
Equally important, the abuse of a few undermine the effectiveness and
jobs of the thousands of honorable officers in Chicago who want nothing
106

107

more than to protect and serve the people of Chicago. See Tracey L. Meares,
Norms, Legitimacy, and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391 (2000) (the
willingness of the public to conform to law depends in large part on public

perception of governmental legitimacy, respect, and courtesy vis-A-vis citizens); see also Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
457 (2000) (abusive policing and unfair procedures raise concerns about the
legitimacy of the law, weakening public participation in the joint enterprise of
public safety).
108 Congress passed the "One Strike and You're Out" policy as a part of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Under "One Strike," a family living in public
housing may be evicted if any member of the family or a guest is arrested for
drug-related activity. A conviction is not necessary. See Dept. of Hous. and
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
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testimonies. Additional felony prosecutions may need to be
abandoned.1o9

III.

CONCLUDING QUESTIONS:

APARTHEID JUSTICE?

The numbers don't lie. The statistical analysis described in
Part II above demonstrates that Chicago has a broken system
for monitoring and disciplining its police officers, satisfying each
of the elements of Monell liability outlined in Part I. This analysis (1) demonstrates the existence of deficient disciplinary and
supervisory policies, (2) provides powerful evidence of deliberate indifference - the affirmative efforts that policymakers
must make not to know about individual and group patterns of
abuse and the egregious harm caused by such abuse and (3) supports several theories of causation, including demonstrating that
minimally effective practices would have identified and stopped
the Skullcap Crew long before they had the chance to hurt Diane and that the City's practices were so patently deficient that
the officers in question were actually encouraged in their patterns of abuse, knowing that they operated with impunity.
Author Jamie Kalven aptly described the CPD's practices for
investigating police abuse, the police code of silence and the Department's supervisory and monitoring systems (including its refusal to examine patterns) collectively as a regime of not
knowing. 110 As the numbers detailed above illustrate plainly, not
knowing about police abuse in Chicago requires a great deal of
active effort. It requires a deep commitment to the machinery of
denial, including denying incidents of brutality, turning a blind
eye to patterns of abuse, refusing to look at data that is just a
key stroke or two away and passively encouraging a culture of
silence in the face of abuse perpetrated by fellow officers.
109 Maurice Possley, When Cops Go Bad, Everyone Pays, CHI.
22, 2006, at 1.
110 Kalven, supra note 1, at 27.
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Given the lengths to which the City has gone to not know
what truths are revealed by its own data, the statistical findings
we outline above raise a series of fundamental questions. States
of impunity do not exist in every community in Chicago. Most
neighborhood districts house few if any repeaters. Just as our
students have witnessed a different Constitution on the ground
in Stateway, the data show that abuse complaints tend to be
concentrated among officers who work in lower income communities of color.
In exploring why this concentration exists, the impact of race
is impossible to ignore and hard to discount. These law enforcement policies impact African Americans and other members of
minority communities the most. Thus, all the effort invested in
not knowing implies a deliberate indifference to the abuse of
Black and Brown people who live in the inner city.
Does a different Constitution apply in inner city minority
communities? And if so, what are its implications?"' Have we
really assessed the true impact of this division - the true human
cost of abusive police officers operating with impunity within an
African American community? How great is the loss of life, liberty and property? The loss of hope and opportunity? The loss
of family? Loss of justice? Loss of faith in our political institu-

111 See, e.g., David Cole, Race, Policing, and the Future of the Criminal Law,
26-SUM HuM. RTS. 2, 3 (Summer 1999) ("Absent race and class disparities,
the privileged among us could not enjoy substantial constitutional protection
of our liberties as we do; and without those disparities, we could not afford
the policy of mass incarceration that we have pursued over the past two decades."); see also Harcourt, supra note 4, at 375 (discusses our deliberate decisions not to know about the human costs of aggressive, discretionary
policing strategies associated with the war on drugs: "The most important
thing in the public policy debates, then, is to decide with eyes wide open and
brutal honesty, how much unconstitutionality we are prepared to live withhow many sexual batteries of black suspects we are willing to perform. We
get to decide.").

Volume 1, Number 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol1/iss2/4

SFpring 2008
40

Futterman et al.: The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and

Chicag o Police Department's Broken Sqstem
tions? Does institutional denial work to disguise the true nature
of what we are doing from ourselves?112

While we do not attempt in this article to answer each of these
questions, we do assert that whatever the answer, we cannot afford not to know. The Stateway Gardens community in which
we performed our work has now been razed. Like the physical
structures that once dominated miles of the State Street corridor, Diane and her former neighbors have also disappeared
from this place. And as the residents vanished, so did the Skullcap Crew. Most of its members, like many former Stateway residents, moved their base of operation to public housing
communities located elsewhere on the South Side of Chicago. A
newly named community (Park Boulevard), with the new eyecatching developments and stores that are popping up, attracting the more well-to-do and completing the erasure of all
that came before. But like the vibrant spirit of the Stateway
Gardens community, these questions persist and demand our attention to prevent the perpetuation of abuse caused by a willfully blind police department.

112 Richard Wright asked many of these same questions in his classic novel,
Native Son, set in the South Side of Chicago, more than 60 years ago. RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940).
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